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- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH -
AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY Supreme Court: 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Petitioners, : 
vs. : Court of Appeals Case 
No.:990218-CA 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and : Labor Commission No.: 97-0538 
CHARLES TJAS, 
Priority 7 
Respondents. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court should review this case of first impression in order to 
establish the proper legal standard for evaluating the compensability of injuries which 
occur in a "work-at-home" circumstance. 
2. Whether the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously sanctions an 
unreasonably broad legal standard when compared with majority opinion in the United 
States and the standard espoused by Professor Larsen. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AE Clevite v. Labor Commission. 2000 UT App 035, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. A 
copy of the Court of Appeals' decision is attached hereto in the appendix. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in this matter on February 10, 2000. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2 (3) (1) (1999). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1) (1996).1 
(1) Each employee described in Section 35-1-432 who is injured and 
the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out 
of and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
This case presents an issue of first impression for the Utah courts: the application 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act to a "work-at-home" situation. The Labor 
Commission found that there was no prior Utah case law or Labor Commission opinion 
which specifically addressed this issue. 
AE Clevite prepared for the Court of Appeals a thorough review of basic 
principles established in Utah case law, as well a survey of the statutory and case law 
from the other 49 states. 
!This code section was renumbered, effective July 1, 1997, as 34A-2-401. 
2This code section was renumbered, effective July 1, 1997, as 34A-2-104. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This case concerns a dispute over the scope of activities which will be considered 
work-related in order for an accident to be found to have "arisen out of and in the course 
of employment under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. Specifically, this case 
concerns an issue of first impression, the application of the Utah Workers Compensation 
Act to a "work at home" situation. 
From 1987 to 1997, Mr. Tjas worked as a district sales manager for AE Clevite, 
with an area covering Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. AE Clevite 
did not maintain an office in Salt Lake City; rather, Mr. Tjas had a computer, a fax, and a 
printer in his den which he used to perform paperwork one day a week. Generally, Mr. 
Tjas would travel to visit clients Monday through Thursday. He typically performed 
office work in his den on Friday. Mr. Tjas never met clients at his home, nor did he ever 
meet with representatives of AE Clevite at his home. Rather, when business meetings 
were held, Mr. Tjas would travel to a local hotel to meet with company representatives. 
Mr. Tjas has lived in the same residence for more than 30 years. The driveway to 
Mr. Tjas' personal residence is steep, and during the winter it sometimes becomes 
slippery due to snow and ice. Mr. Tjas has worried for years about someone falling on 
his driveway, and thus he had developed the practice of shoveling the snow and, 
thereafter, casting salt on the driveway surface. On Monday, January 13, 1997, Mr. Tjas 
slipped and fell while salting his driveway, suffering serious injuries. 
-3-
Mr. Tjas' claim for workers compensation benefits was denied by Liberty Mutual 
(AE Clevite and Liberty Mutual will be hereinafter referred to jointly as "AE Clevite") 
on the basis that his injuries did not "arise out of and in the course of his employment 
with AE Clevite; rather, his injuries arose from a personal activity of salting the driveway 
of his personal residence. Mr. Tjas filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor 
Commission on June 27, 1997. AE Clevite filed an Answer on July 23, 1997, and the 
matter was set for hearing. The parties waived their right to a formal hearing (primarily 
due to logistic difficulties associated with Mr. Tjas' quadripelgia), submitting briefs based 
on deposition testimony relative to the legal issues presented in this case. Administrative 
Law Judge Barbara A. Elicerio entered an Order on July 22, 1998, granting Mr. Tjas1 
claim for workers compensation benefits. A copy of this Order is attached as hereto in 
the appendix. 
AE Clevite filed a timely Motion for Review with the Labor Commission. The 
matter was briefed by the parties, and the Labor Commission issued its order on February 
26, 1999. In reviewing this case, the Labor Commission recognized that it presented an 
issue of first impression. The Commission specifically noted that this case was factually 
difficult and presented a close call to the line that divides compensable injuries from 
noncompensable injuries. The Labor Commission nevertheless concluded that Mr. Tjas' 
act of salting his personal driveway was "incidental" to employment, and therefore 
awarded Mr. Tjas workers compensation benefits for his injuries. A copy of the Labor 
Commission's Order is attached hereto in the appendix. 
-4-
AE Clevite timely filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals on March 
15, 1999, and filed a docketing statement on April 1, 1999. Respondent Charles Tjas 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on April 9, 1999, to which AE Clevite 
responded on April 22, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the Court entered an Order denying 
and deferring Mr. Tjas1 motion following plenary presentation and consideration of this 
case. 
AE Clevite filed its brief on July 6, 1999. Mr. Tjas filed a Motion to Strike an 
Addendum filed with AE Clevite's brief or alternatively to strike AE Clevite's brief and 
Addendum. AE Clevite filed an opposing memorandum. The court denied Mr. Tjas' 
motion on August 26, 1999. 
Mr. Tjas filed his brief on October 15, 1999. The Labor Commission filed its 
brief on October 18, 1999. AE Clevite filed a reply brief on December 16, 1999. 
Oral argument was held on January 24, 2000. The Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion on February 10, 2000. 
Statement of Facts 
The claimant, Charles Tjas, has resided at 2467 Emerson in Salt Lake City, Utah 
since June, 1965. (R. at 276, p. 243.) At the time of his alleged industrial accident, Mr. 
3The Labor Commission's Record in this case consists of the pleadings (Volumes 1 
and 2), two deposition transcripts (Volume 3 is the deposition transcript of Mr. Tjas' 
supervisor, Vince Tramontano, and Volume 4 is the deposition transcript of Mr. Tjas), 
and a video tape of Mr. Tjas1 deposition (Volume 5). Citations for the Statement of Facts 
in this brief come primarily from Mr. Tjas1 deposition transcript, marked as page 276 of 
the Record. 
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Tjas was working as a District Sales Manager for AE Clevite, an automotive engine 
supply company. (R. at 276, pp. 16, 32-34.) 
Mr. Tjas had worked in the same industry since 1977. His first employment in the 
industry was with DAB Industries where he worked from 1977 to 1984. (R. at 276, p. 4.) 
While at DAB Industries, Mr. Tjas was a District Sales Manager, covering the states of 
Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Colorado and Nevada. Mr. Tjas presented 
customers with catalogs and brochures of available items, along with the price list. (R. at 
276, p. 6.) Mr. Tjas traveled a great deal for DAB Industries. He was typically gone 
from Monday morning through Thursday evening, with Friday being used as an "office 
day" to catch up on paper work. (R. at 276, p. 7.) In performing his office work, Mr. 
Tjas had a den in his home that contained a desk, a computer, a fax, and a printer. (R. at 
276, p. 10.) 
In 1984, Mr. Tjas shifted employment to General Battery for an increase in pay. 
Mr. Tjas engaged in the same general routine in the same general geographical area as he 
had with DAB Industries. Rather than selling engine parts, however, Mr. Tjas sold 
batteries. Mr. Tjas worked for General Battery until 1987. (R. at 276, pp. 12, 15.) 
In 1987, Mr. Tjas again shifted employment to AE Clevite, a company which had 
purchased DAB Industries. In essence, Mr. Tjas returned to his former employer. (R. at 
276, p. 16.) At AE Clevite, Mr. Tjas again engaged in the routine of leaving Monday 
morning to make calls on customers, returning home Thursday evening. Mr. Tjas was 
given a company car which he kept at his home. (R. 276, pp. 18, 19.) His geographic 
area included Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. (R. at 276, p. 20.) 
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In making customer calls, Mr. Tjas would take catalogs, brochures, and price lists. He 
also kept a set of engine gaskets in the trunk of his car to show to customers. (R. at 276, 
p. 22.) 
AE Clevite did not direct any of Mr. Tjas' activities at his home. (R. at 276, p. 
23.) Specifically, AE Clevite never directed Mr. Tjas to clear his sidewalks and driveway 
of snow and ice. (R. at 276, p. 32.) Similarly, AE Clevite never directed Mr. Tjas to 
perform any type of general maintenance work on his home or in his yard. (R. at 276, p. 
32.) Indeed, from 1987 through 1997, Mr. Tjas never invited a customer to his home, nor 
did a customer ever come to his home. (R. at 276, pp. 47-48.) Moreover, from 1987 
through 1997, Mr. Tjas never received a visit at home from anyone connected with his 
employment. Rather, whenever his supervisor, Vince Tramontano, came to town, he 
always stayed at a hotel in Salt Lake City, and Mr. Tjas would meet him at his hotel. (R. 
at 276, pp. 48-49; R. at 275, pp. 8-9.) 
Mr. Tjas is a Utah native, born and raised in Bountiful, Utah. (R. at 276, p. 24.) 
As a Utah native, Mr. Tjas is aware that snow is a common occurrence and must be 
cleared off of the driveway and sidewalks. Mr. Tjas used a snow shovel rather than a 
snow blower to clear his sidewalks and driveway. He estimates that he shoveled snow 
about ten times each winter. (R. at 276, p. 25.) Mr. Tjas was aware that a city ordinance 
required all homeowners to clear snow and ice from their sidewalks and driveways. (R. 
at 276, p. 30.) He shared the duty of clearing the snow and ice from the driveway with 
his son. (R. at 276, pp. 24, 31.) 
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Mr. Tjas' driveway is very steep as it approaches the road. Because of the steep 
pitch of the driveway, Mr. Tjas habitually used salt on the driveway. (R. at 276, p. 26.) 
Despite this use of salt over the years, cars nevertheless became stuck "a couple of times" 
on Mr. Tjas' steep driveway. (R. at 276, p. 27.) Mr. Tjas himself had previously slipped 
on his driveway "a few times." (R. at 276, p. 29.) Because of the steepness of the 
driveway, Mr. Tjas testified that "for years I've worried about that driveway and 
someone falling on it." (R. at 276, p. 58.) 
Mr. Tjas was injured on January 13, 1997. He awoke that Monday morning to 
find six to seven inches of snow on his driveway. (R. at 276, p. 34.) Mr. Tjas did not 
shovel any snow that morning; rather, he left in his car about 8:00 to call on some 
accounts around town. (R. at 276, pp. 32-34.) Mr. Tjas' 36-year old son, Jeff, shoveled 
the driveway and walks while Mr. Tjas was at work. (R. at 276, p. 35.) 
Mr. Tjas returned home from work between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. (R. at 276, p. 33.) 
Mr. Tjas changed out of his business clothes, putting on some casual rubber-soled shoes. 
(R. at 276, pp. 41, 60.) Because he was planning to leave on a trip to Montana in two 
days (January 15, 1997), Mr. Tjas spent about an hour organizing items in the trunk of 
his car. Mr. Tjas estimates that he made about ten trips to his car. (R. at 276, pp. 37-38.) 
Mr. Tjas suffered no injury while loading his car or organizing his materials. After Mr. 
Tjas had completed loading his car, he returned without incident to his house. (R. at 276, 
p. 39.) 
Mr. Tjas was expecting to receive a package from Arizona prior to his scheduled 
trip to Montana in two days. (R. at 276, pp. 50-51.) The package could have been sent 
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by UPS, Federal Express, or US Mail. (R. at 276, p. 50.) Mr. Tjas had no idea how the 
package in question had been sent, (R. at 276, p. 50), nor did he know exactly when it 
would arrive. (R. at 276, p. 58.) He did know that the package would be bulky and 
awkward. (R. at 276, p. 58.). 
While standing inside his kitchen, Mr. Tjas happened to observe through his 
window the mail carrier coming up the street. Mr. Tjas lives on a dead-end street, and 
the mail carrier must deliver the mail to Mr. Tjas at a mailbox attached to the home next 
to Mr. Tjasf front door. (R. at 276, pp. 28, 39, 42.) Mr. Tjas returned outside, picked up 
a nearly empty 50-pound bag of salt, and began his routine of salting the driveway. (R. at 
276, pp. 39-40.) It made no difference to Mr. Tjas whether he received a business 
package or not - his intent was to make the driveway safer for the mail carrier. 
According to Mr. Tjas: 
Q: [by attorney Atkin] You were saying that the company used Fed 
Ex, UPS and regular mail? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you remember why you thought the mailman had that 
package that particular day? 
A: I didn't know for sure that he did. 
Q: Uh-huh. 
A: But in case he did, I wanted to make sure that he didn't get hurt. 
Q: And why did the package make any difference, I assume you 
wouldn't want him to get hurt even if he was carrying your regular 
mail. 
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A: Well. I would have thrown the salt anyway. Well, the box is 
quite awkward and I knew that if he had it — you know I've always 
been afraid of that driveway. 
(R. at 276, p. 58, emphasis added.) 
Mr. Tjas began to broadcast the salt onto his driveway with his hand. The 
driveway did not appear to be slippery to Mr. Tjas. However, when he reached the steep 
part of his driveway, he slipped and fell backwards, suffering his catastrophic injury. (R. 
at 276, pp. 40-42.) He was taken by ambulance to the hospital. (R. at 276, p. 43.) Mr. 
Tjas has been diagnosed as suffering from C3-4 quadriplegia. Mr. Tjas did not receive 
his anticipated package on January 13, 1997, from any source. Rather, a package arrived 
for him the next day. (R. at 276, p. at 64.) 
Following his injury, Mr. Tjas received salary continuation benefits and short-term 
disability benefits through July 15, 1997. (R. at 75.) On May 29, 1997, Mr. Tjas applied 
for long-term disability benefits through his employer. In his application for LTD 
benefits, Mr. Tjas specifically affirmed that his injury was not work-related, and he did 
not intend to file a workers compensation claim. (R. at 70.) 
Nevertheless, on June 27, 1997, Mr. Tjas filed a claim for workers compensation 
benefits with the Labor Commission of Utah. The claim was denied by AE Clevite on 
the basis that it did not "arise out of and in the course of Mr. Tjas? employment with AE 
Clevite. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE LAW 
THAT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
This case presents an issue of first impression for the Utah courts: the application 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act to a "work at home" situation. The Labor 
Commission found that there was no prior Utah case law or Labor Commission opinion 
which specifically addressed this issue. A thorough review of the case law from the 49 
other states, provided as an appendix to the Utah Court of Appeals, revealed that, like 
Utah, not every state has had the opportunity to expressly address this issue. Of those 
states which have reviewed this issue, only a small minority follow the extremely broad 
rule propounded by the Utah Labor Commission and adopted, with minimal analysis, by 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In the age of telecommuting and virtual offices, with both employers and 
employees seeking greater flexibility as to how, and where, employees may work, the 
Utah Supreme Court should exercise its authority to review this case to insure that the 
proper legal standard is in place for evaluating compensability of injuries which occur, 
with increasing frequency, in a "work-at-home" situation. The standard which this Court 
adopts will undoubtably affect the policies and positions that employers will take with 
employees seeking to perform part or all of their work at a home work-site. 
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of this issue, the parties thoroughly 
researched and submitted briefs which addressed this issue in great detail and depth. In 
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fact, both AE Clevite and Mr. Tjas submitted appendices with summarized research on 
statues and case law from the 49 other jurisdictions. Utah case law was also thoroughly 
researched and discussed. 
In response, the Court of Appeals issued a brief opinion with minimal analysis and 
discussion, only two pages in length. The opinion is void of any recognition of the fact 
that this case presents an issue of first impression. Moreover, there is no mention in the 
court's opinion of a number of arguments raised by the parties. 
The opinion quotes language from Buczynski v. Labor Commission. 934 P.2d 
1169 (Utah App. 1997), as the appropriate standard to apply m this case. The Buczynski 
case, however, is an inappropriate case upon which to rely because the pivotal issue in 
Buczynski relates to the continuous coverage rule (which provides 24 hour coverage for 
traveling employees) and whether Ms. Buczynski had deviated from her employment at 
the time of the injury. Moreover, the language quoted by the Court of Appeals from 
Buczynski comes originally from M & K v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1948), where, again, the issue in the case was deviation from employment. This reliance 
is notable since, in deviation cases, the employee is essentially presumed to be in the 
course of employment until the facts show a sufficient deviation to bring them outside of 
the coverage of the Act. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals' citation and reliance on Black v. McDonald's of 
Layton, 733 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987), is curious since this Court in Black, after stating the 
general language cited by the Court of Appeals, adopted and applied a four-part test to 
use in analyzing claims involving injuries during an employee's participation in 
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recreation activities. In adopting the four-part test, this Court did not simply apply a 
general standard. Rather, the Court applied a standard which recognized the unique 
nature of recreation activities and competing policy interests that were presented by this 
type of claim. Notably, the Court of Appeals did not mention the four-part test in its 
opinion for this case. 
The Utah courts have historically recognized that the standard for determining 
course and scope of employment is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each 
injury. The legal standard for compensable injuries which occur on an employer's 
premises is very broad. For example, under the personal comfort doctrine practically any 
injury will be compensable if it occurs on the job site while performing acts of "personal 
comfort." In contrast, the legal standard is much more stringent for injuries which occur 
away from an employer-controlled premises. For example, under the dual purpose rule, 
an activity must be primarily or predominantly work-related in order to be compensable. 
Martinson v. Industrial Comm'n. 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980); Ogden Standard Examiner 
v. Industrial Common. 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983). The four-part test for recreation cases in 
Black provides a flexible standard, allowing greater coverage for activities occurring on 
an employer's premises during business hours, while similarly providing lesser coverage, 
or no coverage, for recreation activities which occur outside of the employer's control. 
The location of an injury and the degree of an employer's control over the 
employee's activities are both crucial to determining the appropriate legal standard to be 
used in evaluating course-of-employment cases. Under the analysis set forth by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Tjas, there is no distinction in the legal standard which applies to the 
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variety of situations in which course-of-employment issues are evaluated, including 
whether an injury occurs on the employer's premises or at the employee's home. Rather, 
the court's opinion espouses a one-size-fits-all approach, without recognizing the unique 
policy considerations presented by this new issue. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion has far-reaching implications on the definition of 
compensable activities, particularly for employees who perform part or all of their work 
at a home office. It is, arguably, the functional equivalent of establishing 24-hour 
coverage for employees who work at home. Employers and carriers will have little 
defense to claims for injuries which occur at home if, as in the case of Mr. Tjas, the 
subjective intent of the employee (I intended to aid my employer by salting my own 
driveway) is sufficient to satisfy the burden of demonstrating that an injury is work-
related. 
n. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION ERRONEOUSLY SANCTIONS 
AN UNREASONABLY BROAD APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT. 
Rule 46 (a) (3) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that this Court 
may grant a petition for writ of certiorari "[when a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." In the present case, the Court of 
Appeals' opinion sanctions an unreasonably broad and erroneous interpretation of Utah 
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case law concerning the scope of activities that will be considered work-related for 
purposes of workers compensation benefits. 
The standard declared by the Court of Appeals is quoted from Buczynski v. 
Industrial Commission. 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As discussed above, this 
language comes from a case in which the court adopted the continuous coverage rule for 
traveling employees. The issue in Buczynski was whether the employee's injury 
occurred during a significant deviation from the business trip. To apply this general 
language to the present case fails to recognize the basic differences between the factual 
situation of these cases. Buczynski is neither analogically nor analytically appropriate to 
use in the present case. 
The Court of Appeals endorsed the Labor Commission's reasoning that Mr. Tjas' 
injury was compensable because it occurred "when he was removing an obstacle which 
could have impeded his work." AE Clevite. 1999 UT 0035, If 10, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21. The court's conclusion endorses a standard which allows an employee's subjective 
intent for potential benefit to his employer to be a sufficient ground to impose liability 
upon an employer for workers compensation benefits. Mental intent has never been, nor 
should it be. a sufficient basis for awarding workers compensation benefits. See, e.g.. 
Martinson v. Industrial Commission. 606 P.2d 256, 258 n. 4 (Utah 1980). Rather, the 
standard should require objective facts which adequately demonstrate that the activity 
engaged in at the time of the accident was sufficiently work-related to impose liability 
upon the employer and its insurance carrier. The statutory requirements of the Workers 
Compensation Act limiting compensable injuries to those which "arise out of and in the 
-15-
course of employment are otherwise severely undermined to the point of being rendered 
meaningless. 
In Martinson, this Court observed that workers compensation coverage "does not, 
and as a practical matter, cannot extend to any injury done to an employee wherever and 
whenever it happens, but is limited to accidental injuries which occur in the course of or 
arise out of the performance of his duties." 606 P.2d at 257-258. Notably, a "special 
problem exists in some occupations such as salesmen, where there is elasticity both as to 
the place and hours of such performance." Id. at 258. Thus, when an activity allegedly 
involves a mixed business and personal purpose, the employee should only be deemed to 
be in the course of employment when the objective facts demonstrate that the "paramount 
or predominant purpose" of the activity is to serve the employer's interest. If the 
business purpose is merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person should not be 
deemed to be in the course of his employment." Id. 
In the present case, the Court affirmed a standard which allows the award of 
benefits based solely upon possibilities and subjective intent. There are no objective 
facts to support a work-relationship of salting Mr. Tjas' driveway on the day of the 
accident to his work. While Mr. Tjas may have been expecting a package, he knew 
neither the day nor the manner in which it would arrive. Further, Mr. Tjas claimed to be 
concerned about salting the driveway because the business package was large and 
awkward. However, no large and awkward package was delivered that day, and when 
Mr. Tjas saw the mail carrier he did not see any such package. In short, there were no 
articulable business reasons for Mr. Tjas to salt his driveway on January 13, 1997. On 
-16-
the other hand, there were several articulable reasons for Mr. Tjas to salt his driveway as 
a homeowner: to comply with a city ordinance, to prevent personal liability if neighbors 
or others slipped on the steep driveway, and to assure safe delivery of his personal mail. 
Finally, and most importantly, Mr. Tjas admitted that he would have taken the same 
action of salting his driveway even if he had not had the subjective belief that the 
mailman might be bringing him some work-related item. 
The standard affirmed by the Court of Appeals is the most broad and sweeping 
interpretation of the course-of-employment provisions of any state in the nation. It 
contradicts the substance and spirit of the fundamental requirement of workers 
compensation law - that the injury have a "sufficient nexus with the employment to be 
said to be within the course of such employment." Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 
P.2d 964, 969 (Utah 1993). Instead, it requires merely that there be an "incidental" 
relationship to work. 
The majority of the states which have considered this issue have required more 
than an "incidental benefit" to the employer before awarding workers compensation 
benefits. See Russellville Gas Company v. Duggar. 260 So.2d 393 (Ala. Civ. App.), 
cert, denied 260 So.2d 395 (Ala. 1970) (Benefits were denied to a claimant who slipped 
and fell while walking to an employer-owned vehicle parked in the employee's yard. The 
Court found that it was "merely incidental" that the employee's means of transportation 
was a company truck which he might have used to perform a service for his employer if 
called during the weekend. The court noted that had the employee actually been 
responding to a call from the employer to use the truck for a work related purpose, they 
-17-
would have no difficulty placing him within the protection of the workers compensation 
act.)4; Ralph Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Ca. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997) (The 
employee's telephone call with the employer was not a service incidental to his 
employment.); Glasser v. Youth Shop. 54 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1951) (A slip and fall on a 
home stairway was not compensable notwithstanding the fact that the employee was 
carrying a work record book.); Thompson v. Heckendorn Manf. Co.. 367 P.2d 72 (Kan. 
1961) (Compensation denied because installing a storm window in the family home 
which was also used for the corporate office was not incidental to the corporation's 
business); Guaglino v. Ace Bakery Div. of Lakeland Bakery. Inc.. 275 So.2d 874 (La. Ct. 
App. 1973) (An electrocution injury while using a blower from the employer's bakery 
was not compensable. The employee failed to show that he brought the blower home for 
a business purpose and that he had any business purpose to use it at the time of his 
injury.); Owen v. Chrysler Corp.. 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1985) (shoveling snow to 
move a car was merely preparatory work rather than the employee's actual work duties); 
Fingers v. Mt. Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1969) (An injury 
while descending steps was not compensable. The custodian who lived on-site was found 
not to be performing any duty for which he had been employed at the time of the injury.); 
Fortnerv.J.K. Holding Co.. 349 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (The incidental benefit 
to the employer was not so appreciable as to render the claimant's aesthetic positioning of 
4But Cf Black River Dairy v. Dept. of Industry. 207 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (An 
injury from a slip and fall while walking from home to the employer's truck was 
compensable since the employee's work commenced the moment he left the door of his 
home.). 
-18-
plants at her home to be an actual work duty.); Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church. 
147 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1966) (injury arose from a personal act which was only of 
incidental benefit to the employer); Van Devander v. West Side M.E. Church. 160 A. 763 
(N.J. 1932) (The employee was performing a household duty for his own benefit which 
was insufficiently related to his actual work duties as a minister.); Roberts v. Stell 367 
N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985) (The court rejected the claimants argument that grocery 
shopping was naturally related and incidental to living and eating on-site, as required by 
the nature of her employment.); Lloyd v. Texas Employed Ins. Ass'n. 280 S.W.2d 955 
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1955) (An employee's injury while descending a ladder to answer a 
phone call which may have been work-related was not compensable). 
Professor Larson's proposed rule for work-at-home injuries is very similar to the 
majority rule outlined above. Professor Larson would allow compensation for injuries 
which occur at home only if the accident occurs during the actual performance of the 
work. 1A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation, desk Edition, §18.34 (1998). 
According to Larson's analysis, the court should first identify the injured worker's 
actual work duties. Only injuries which occur during the actual performance of the work 
duty would be compensable. In the case of Mr. Tjas, had he slipped and fallen while 
taking materials to his car in preparation for his upcoming trip, that accident would be 
compensable since it occurred during the performance of an actual work responsibility. 
However, the mere salting of his driveway, as Mr. Tjas had done for more than thirty 
years, simply does not rise to the level of the actual performance of work. 
-19-
This Court should accordingly accept the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and fully 
review this important issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This presents an important issue of state law which few courts in this nation have 
had the opportunity to consider. Changes in technology and work-relationships require 
the courts to review and evaluate the application of traditional standards to new 
situations. This Court should accept this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2000. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Michael ii. Dyer 
Dori K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
AE Clevite, Inc. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
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WILKINS, Judge: 
1fl Petitioners Ae Clevite, Inc., and its insurance 
carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, seek 
review from a final order of the Utah Labor 
Commission (Commission) entered on February 26, 
1999, awarding Mr. Charles Tjas workers' 
compensation benefits from an injury occurring at his 
home. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 Neither party disputes the facts of this case. In its 
ruling the Commission found that Mr. Tjas sustained 
a severe neck injury causing quadriplegia on January 
13,1997, while spreading salt on the driveway of his 
residence. When the injury occurred, Mr. Tjas was 
employed by Ae Clevite, an automotive supply 
company, as a district sales manager in Utah and 
several surrounding states. Because Ae Clevite did 
not have an office in Salt Lake City, it authorized Mr. 
Tjas to use his personal residence in Salt Lake City as 
a base of operations for his work. Ae Clevite 
provided Mr. Tjas with various office supplies, a car, 
and frequently delivered company correspondence 
and other materials to Mr. Tjas's home by U.S. mail 
or private courier. Part of Mr. Tjas's duties included 
making sales calls and performing office work at 
home. 
13 The night before the accident, several inches of 
snow fell on Mr. Tjas's steep driveway. The next 
morning, Mr. Tjas drove to several local sales calls 
but did not clear the snow. Although Mr. Tjas's son 
removed the snow later that morning, the driveway 
remained icy. After returning home in the mid-
afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent nearly an hour loading his 
car with material for an upcoming sales trip and 
waited for a large package to be delivered in 
observed the mailman approaching, he decided to 
spread salt on the driveway so the postman could 
make his delivery more safely. In doing so, however, 
Mr. Tjas slipped on the ice and fell, suffering a severe 
neck injury. 
\A Mr. Tjas subsequently filed a claim for workers' 
compensation benefits with the Utah Labor 
Commission for his injuries. The Commission's 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Mr. 
Tjas's injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment and awarded benefits. The Labor 
Commission subsequently affirmed the ALJ's 
decision awarding Mr. Tjas compensation pursuant to 
section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code. Ae Clevite and 
its insurance carrier filed this petition for judicial 
review. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 5 This case involves the application of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act to a "work at home" 
situation. Specifically, we consider whether the 
Commission erred in determining that Mr. Tjas's 
injury "arose out of and in the course of his 
employment with Ae Clevite, thus entitling him to 
workers' compensation benefits under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1997), the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
U6 The applicable standard of review for a formal 
adjudicative hearing is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997); see also Caporoz v. 
Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). "When the Legislature has granted an agency 
discretion to determine an issue, we review the 
agency's action for reasonableness." Caproz 945 P.2d 
at 143; see Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(stating "[w]hen there exists a grant of discretion, 'we 
will not disturb the Board's application of its factual 
findings to the law unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality'") 
(citation omitted). Absent a grant of discretion, we 
use a correction-of-error standard '"in reviewing an 
agency's interpretation or application of a statutory 
term."' Cross, 824 P.2d at 1204 (citation omitted). 
f7 In this case, the Legislature has granted the 
Commission discretion to determine the facts and 
apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before 
it. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997).2 As 
such, we must uphold the Commission's 
determination that Mr. Tjas's injury "arose out of and 
in the course of his employment, unless the 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the 
UAPA. See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 (indicating 
agency has abused its discretion when agency action 
is unreasonable). Moreover, we resolve "'[a]ny doubt 
respecting the right of compensation in favor of the 
injured employee."' Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 
P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
z ANALYSIS 
1[8 To qualify for workers' compensation benefits in 
Utah, a person must be an employee who suffers an 
injury caused by an accident. See Buczynski v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). In addition, the employee must prove 
i~ AE Clevite v. Li 
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wo essential elements under section 34A-2-401: (1) 
he accident occurred "in the course o f the 
mployment, and (2) the accident "arose out o f the 
mployment. Id.3 An employee must prove both 
lements by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 
Petitioners do not dispute that Mr. Tjas sustained an 
ccidental injury. Rather, petitioners argue that the 
ijury does not satisfy either of the elements of 
action 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code. 
A. "In the Course of" Employment 
9 First, petitioners argue that Mr. Tjas's injury did 
ot arise "in the course o f his employment because 
.e Clevite never requested, directed, encouraged, or 
sasonably expected Mr. Tjas to salt his driveway and 
ecause Mr. Tjas was not in an "employer controlled" 
ea when the injury occurred. Utah courts, however, 
ive recognized that an employee's injury arises in 
e course of employment even if these circumstances 
e not present. Indeed, "[u]nder Utah law, an 
xident occurs 'in the course of employment when it 
ccurs while the employee is rendering services to 
s employer which he was hired to do or doing 
mething incidental thereto, at the time when and 
e place where he was authorized to render such 
rvice."' Buczynski, 934 P.2d at 1172 (citations 
rutted; emphasis added); see Black v. McDonald's of 
\yton, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987) (indicating 
cident is in scope of employment when it occurs 
rithin the period of employment, at a place or area 
lere the employee may reasonably be, and while the 
iployee is engaged in an activity at least incidental 
his employment"); 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' 
mpensation § 266 (1992) (same). An activity is 
icidental to the employee's employment if it 
vances, directly or indirectly, his employer's 
erests.%x Black, 733 P.2d at 156 (emphasis added). 
0 In this case, the Commission concluded that 
r. Tjas's injury arose in the course of his 
iployment because his efforts to make his driveway 
"e for the delivery of work-related materials was 
:asonably incidental" to his work for Ae Clevite. j 
ecifically, it ruled that the ability of Ae Clevite to 
/e work-related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas's 
me by mail or courier service was an "integral part 
the employment relationship," so that Mr. Tjas's 
ivity was "reasonably incidental" to his business. 
s agree. Although Mr. Tjas was not performing a 
rk-related duty or in an employer-controlled area 
en the injury occurred, he was removing an 
itacle which could have impeded his work and was 
he location of his regular place of work when the 
lry occurred. We recognize that Mr. Tjas may have 
ided to salt the driveway at some other time for his 
n non-job related purposes, yet the fact remains 
t when he did, it was in an attempt to remove a 
die that could have prevented the delivery of the 
>ected business package. In other words, Mr. Tjas's 
of salting the driveway was motivated in-part by 
mrpose to benefit Ae Clevite and thus was 
sonably incidental, rather than tangentially related, 
his employment. As such, the Commission 
rectly concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in 
course o f his employment. 
B. "Arising out of" Employment 
Second, petitioners argue that Mr. Tjas's 
iry did not "arise out o f his employment with Ae 
Code-Co 
Provo, Utah 
maintain his premises, a risk Mr. Tjas would have 
been equally exposed to apart from his employment. 
Tf 12 In Buczynski we stated that in Utah, 
[a]n accident arises out of employment when 
there is a causal relationship between the 
injury and the employment. Arising out of, 
however, does not mean that the accident 
must be caused by the employment; rather, 
the employment is thought of more as a 
condition out of which the event arises than 
as the force producing the event in 
affirmative fashion. 
934 P.2d at 1172 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted; emphasis in original); see also 82 Am. Jur. 
2d Workers' Compensation § 269 (1992) (indicating 
the "arising out o f requirement must be satisfied by 
a showing of "causal connection between work and 
injury"; "the injury must have been one of the risks 
connected with the employment, flowing therefrom as 
a natural consequence and must have been directly 
connected with the work"). 
\ 13 Under the facts of this case, we agree with the 
Commission that Mr. Tjas's injury arose from a risk 
associated with his work for Ae Clevite due to the 
parties' "work at home" arrangement. As such, we 
hold the Commission did not err in ruling that Mr. 
Tjas's injury arose from his employment with Ae 
Clevite. 
CONCLUSION 
f l 4 As a general proposition, the Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
(1997), applies to "work at home" situations when a 
person sustains an injury by an accident "arising out 
of and in the course o f the employee's employment. 
Moreover, we hold that under these facts, Mr. Tjas's 
injury at his home falls within the category of 
compensability under section 34A-2-401 because it 
was an injury that arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. 
1[15 Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
\\6 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and 
participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a 
member of the Utah Supreme Court. 
2. This section provides: "The commission has the duty and 
the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 
(1997). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (1997) reads: 
Each employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on account of 
the injury... and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines . . . as 
provided in this chapter. 
ibor Commission 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
FILED 
AUG 2 6 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
AE Clevite, Inc., and Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Labor Commission of Utah and 
Charles Tjas 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING T JAS' S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case No. 990218-CA 
This matter is before the court on Tjasfs motion to strike 
petitioners1 addendum "A" and/or brief. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the motion is denied. Tjas may submit an addendum in 
response to petitioners1 addendum "A" which is the same length. 
However, any summary of Tjasfs addendum must be contained in the 
body of his brief as petitioners have done. We do not expect 
that petitioners will submit a reply addendum. 
Tjas's brief is due on or before September 24, 1999. 
Dated this fZk? day of August, 1999. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jacjtfson, J u d g e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on August 27, 1999, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
DORI K. PETERSEN 
BLACKBURN & STOLL LC 
77 W 200 S STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1609 
K. DAWN ATKIN 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
311 S STATE STR STE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in 
Interdepartmental Mailing to be delivered to the parties listed 
below: 
ALAN HENNEBOLD 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 E 300 S STE 300 
PO BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Dated this August 27, 1999. 
U-By C^Ai-fii rf 
Deputy ClefTc £J 
Case No. 990218-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
COURT 
Ae Clevite, Inc. and Liberty-
Mutual Insurance Company, 
Petitioners and Appellants, 
Labor Commission of Utah and 
Charles Tjas, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
ORDER DENYING AND 
DEFERRING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 990218-CA 
This matter is before the court on respondent Charles Tjas's 
motion for summary disposition. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
motion is denied and that the issues raised are deferred until 
plenary presentation and consideration of the case. 
DATED thisc^^day of April, 1999. 
Tamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 26, 1999, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
ALAN HENNEBOLD 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 E 300 S STE 300 
PO BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
DORI K. PETERSEN 
BLACKBURN & STOLL LC 
77 W 200 S STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1609 
K. DAWN ATKIN 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
311 S STATE STR STE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this April 26, 1999. 
By VH- M^n <r> 
Deputy Clerk ^Ttf 
Case No. 990218-CA 
A-2 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
CHARLES TJAS, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
v. * 
AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY * 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
* Case No. 97-0538 
Defendants. * 
AE Clevite, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company (referred to jointiy as "Clevite"' hereafter) ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Charles Tjas under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
Ig$UE?RE$gNT^D 
Did Mr. Tjas's injury of January 13,1997 arise "out of and in the course of his employment 
by Clevite? 
FINPTNGSQFFACT 
The Commission finds the following facts to be relevant to the issue raised by Clevite's 
motion for review.1 
In proceedings before the ALJ, the parties agreed that Clevite would submit a written 
statement of its version of the relevant facts. Mr. Tjas would then submit a written response 
modifying Clevite's statement of facts to the extent Mr. Tjas believed necessary. While the 
Commission recognizes the parties hoped to achieve efficiency through this procedure, it is 
unsatisfactory to the Commission because it neither binds the parties to a definite statement 
of stipulated facts, nor provides an evidentiary record sufficient to resolve disputed facts. 
In this case, the parties continue to dispute certain details of Mr. Tjas's claim. It is only 
because the essential facts of the claim are undisputed that the Commission does not remand 
this case for an evidentiary hearing. In future cases, the Commission discourages the use of 
the fact gathering process that was attempted here. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as district sales manager for 
Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. Clevite did not maintain an office in Salt 
Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal residence as a base of operations for his work. 
To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and 
answering machine for use in his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were 
delivered by U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr. Tjas 
with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday through Thursday 
and performed office work at home on Friday. 
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In winter, the driveway 
is sometimes slick from snow or ice and, consequently, is ha2ardous to cars and pedestrians. It was 
Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snow from the driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface. 
The night before Mr. Tjas's accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake City. The next 
morning, Monday, January 13,1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local sales calls, but did not first clear 
the snow from his sidewalk and driveway. Instead, Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas 
was making his sales calls. However, the driveway remained icy. 
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading his car with 
material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by Clevite to expect delivery of 
a large package to be used in connection with the trip. Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package 
was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be 
delivered that day or the next Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching, he 
decided to spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and 
make his delivery to the Tjas residence. 
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury for which he 
now seeks workers' compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that "(e)ach 
employee... injured... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever such injury occurred,.. . shall be paid compensation . . . and medical... expenses, as 
provided by this chapter." It is undisputed that Mr. Tjas: 1) was employed by Clevite; 2) was injured 
by accident on January 13,1997; 3) was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injury. 
Consequently, it is only necessary for Mr. Tjas to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
injury '"arose out of and in the course of his work for Clevite in order to qualify for the benefits 
provided by the Act. 
In Buczvnski v. Industrial Commission. 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah 
Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of the terms "arising out of employment" and "arising in 
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the course of employment" as follows: 
Under Utah law, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it 
"occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired 
to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he 
was authorized to render such service." M & K Corp- v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 
Utah 488 493,189 P.2d 132,134 (1948). 
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal relationship' 
between the injury and the employment." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 888 P.2d 707,712 (Utah CL App. 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah 
493,189 P.2d at 134), cert, denied 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). "4 Arising out of/" 
however, does not mean that the accident must be '"caused by5" the employment; 
rather the employment *"is thought of more as a condition out of which the event 
arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" Commercial 
Carriers. 888 P.2d at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise). 
In applying the foregoing standards to Mr. Tjas's claim, the Commission is guided by prior 
appellate decisions which articulate the public policy underlying in Utah's workers' compensation 
system. As the Utah Supreme Court recently noted in Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 
177,182 (Utah 1997): 
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide economic protection for 
employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment, therefore 
"alleviat(ing) hardship upon workers and their families." Baker v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965). We have held that "(t)o give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage" and 
that "(a)ny doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the 
injured employee." State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n 685 P.2d 1051,1053 
(Utah 1984). 
However, the principle of "liberal construction* for the Act, as stated in Drake and other 
appellate decisions is not without limits. Utah's appellate courts have held that injuries only 
tangentially related to work are not compensable. For example, see Walls v. Industrial 
Commission. 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993) (Judge Jackson dissenting.) Whether an injury arises 
out of and in the course of employment depends upon the specific facts of each case. Inevitably, 
some cases will fail close to the line that divides compensable injuries from noncompensable 
injuries. In the Commission's view, this is such a case. 
To assist in the resolution of this matter, the Commission has carefully reviewed the appellate 
decisions from Utah and other states cited by the parties. For the most part, the cited decisions deal 
with injuries either sustained during employee travel, or during activities undertaken at the specific 
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direction of the employer. A few of the cited cases do involve "work at home" situations, but the 
facts of those cases are substantially different from the facts of Mr. Tjas's claim. Consequently, no 
specific rule can be extracted from such cases that can properly be applied to Mr. Tjas's 
circumstances. Therefore, the Commission returns to the fundamental principles of Utah workers' 
compensation law, as described by Utah's appellate courts. 
As noted above, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it "occurs while 
the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something 
incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such service/' 
M & K C<?rp. V. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132. 134 (1948). (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case at hand, Mr. Tjas and his employer had, by joint agreement turned parts of Mr. 
Tjas's home into his workplace. This arrangement may, or may not, have been in Mr. Tjas's best 
interest, but the arrangement obviously freed Clevite from the expense and responsibility of 
maintaining a stand-alone office. Clevite's arrangement with Mr. Tjas did not transform every part 
of his home into a work premise, nor was every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home work-
related. However, Clevite's ability to have work related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas's home by 
mail or courier service was an integral part of the employment relationship between Clevite and Mr. 
Tjas. 
In analyzing the problems presented when an employee is authorized to perform work at 
home, Professor Larson has concluded that "(e)ven when the service performed at home is casual 
or relatively unimportant, an injury occurring in the actual performance of it is in the course of 
employment " Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. §18.34, page 4-427. Based on decisions 
from several jurisdictions, Professor Larson further concludes that u . . . once it is established that 
the home premises are also the work premises,... it follows that the hazards of home premises 
encountered in connection with the performance of the work are also hazards of the employment" 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 18.34, at page 4-428. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission finds that under the specific facts of this case, Mr. 
Tjas's efforts to make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the 
performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while salting his 
driveway arise "in the course"of his employment for Clevite. 
Having concluded that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "in the course of his employment, the 
Commission must next determine whether die injuries also arose "out of his employment, as also 
required by §34A-2-401 of the Act. As previously noted, "arising out of does not mean that the 
accident must be caused by the employment. Rather, the employment is thought of more as a 
condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion. 
Buczvnski at 1172. Certainly, Mr. Tjas's injuries arose "out of his work related efforts to make his 
driveway safe. 
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In summary, the Commission concludes, as did the AU, that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose out 
of and in the course of his employment at Clevite. Consequently, Mr. Tjas is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits for those injuries. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Clevite's motion for review. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this s& day of February, 1999. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
Utah Labor Commission 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGTO? 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Case No. 97538 
* 
CHARLES TJAS, * 
Petitioner, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AE CLEVITE, INC./LIBERTY * AND ORDER 
MUTUAL INSURANCE, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Utah Labor Commission, 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 2, 
1997 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
converted to an attorneys conference, at the 
request of the attorneys. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner was represented by Dawn Atkin, 
Attorney. 
The respondents were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits associated with a January 13, 1997 fall on ice, resulting 
in quadriplegia. The only issue to be resolved is the question of 
whether on not the petitioner had a compensable industrial injury 
on January 13, 1997. The petitioner has claimed that, at the time 
of the fall, he was performing a duty .incidental to his work 
responsibilities and thus his accident entitles him to workers 
compensation benefits. The respondents argue that the petitioner 
was not performing work duties when he was injured, but rather was 
merely salting his driveway, a normal homeowner activity. At the 
time of the hearing, the attorneys indicated that they were in 
basic agreement with the facts of the fall, and only had 
differences on what result was appropriate when the law was applied 
to the facts. As a result, the attorneys requested that the 
hearing be canceled and requested that they be allowed to present 
the competing legal arguments in written briefs to be submitted 
post-hearing. The ALJ agreed to allow this manner of presenting 
the case. A briefing scheduled was set up, at the time of the 
meeting on December 2, 1997. The briefing was completed as of 
January 30, 1998, when the matter was considered ready for 
decision. 
ORDER 
RE: CHARLES TJAS 
PAGE 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The relevant facts are stated in the briefs submitted by the 
parties* The ALJ will recite just those facts essential to the 
ALJ's decision to follow. 
As of January 30, 1997, the date of injury, the petitioner 
was employed by AE Clevite, as a traveling sales representative. 
He earned $36,500.00 per year in this position, at that time, and 
had a wife, and no minor dependent children. The only place of 
employment that the petitioner utilized was his home office. The 
petitioner had a separate room in his home that he used as his 
office. In that room, the petitioner had a computer, a printer, a 
phone, and an answering machine, all of which were provided to him 
by his employer. He also had numerous catalogs and price lists 
provided by the employer in that room. The employer had set up a 
separate phone line to the petitioner's office as well. The 
employer also provided the petitioner with a car, which he used to 
travel to various locations to service customers. The petitioner 
worked exclusively out of his home and had no central office to 
which he reported. The petitioner received all his business mail 
and packages at his home. 
On January 30, 1997, the petitioner had done some work 
traveling, apparently locally, to service some customers. He then 
returned to his home, to prepare for a business trip he was to take 
two days later. He loaded his car with the necessary lists and 
catalogs and other items that he needed for the trip. The 
petitioner was waiting to receive a display that he needed to take 
with him. That display was to be delivered to his home, either by 
regular mail or some other delivery system (i.e. UPS, etc.). The 
petitioner had spoken with the individual responsible for sending 
him the display and understood that the display was to be delivered 
to him at some time on January 30, 1997. After completing loading 
his car, the petitioner became aware that the mail carrier was 
close by. This caused the petitioner to be concerned about his 
steep driveway and the fact that the surface might be icy. He 
therefore went and retrieved a large bag of salt and proceeded to 
broadcast the salt onto the driveway. As he did so, he fell 
suffering the neck injury that caused his quadriplegia. The fall 
occurred in the afternoon, during the hours that he normally 
worked. 
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The petitioner stated in his deposition that he was 
concerned regarding the possibility that the mail carrier might be 
delivering the display. He stated that the display was heavy and 
awkward (measuring 3 feet by 6 inches) and he thought this might 
cause difficulty for the carrier, while negotiating a slippery 
driveway. The petitioner stated that he probably would have salted 
the driveway out of concern for the carrier, even if the display 
was not being delivered by mail. The petitioner had salted his 
driveway over the years, as needed. The display actually was never 
delivered on January 30, 1997, but instead came to the petitioner's 
home on January 31, 1997. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
The petitioner argues that the salting of the driveway was 
a work-related activity, necessary to ensure that the display he 
needed for his business trip, could be delivered to him without 
problem. The petitioner argues that the fact that he may have 
gotten some personal benefit out of salting his driveway should not 
prevent a conclusion that the salting of the driveway had a work 
purpose to it. The petitioner argues that, in choosing to have the 
petitioner work out of his home, the employer has, in essence, 
converted the petitioner's home into the employer's work premises. 
As such, the traditional legal presumption of compensability 
applicable to injuries on the employer's work premises should apply 
to injuries sustained by the petitioner while working at his home. 
The respondent has argued that the salting of the driveway 
was simply a homeowner responsibility that the petitioner chose to 
do on January 30, 1997 and that it was not an activity that was 
engaged in for the benefit of the employer. The respondent argues 
that this is clear from the petitioner' own admission that he would 
have salted the driveway regardless of whether or not the mail 
carrier was bringing the package on January 30, 1997. The 
respondent argues that case law supports the requirement that 
injuries sustained at home are compensable injuries only where they 
are sustained while the employee is engaged in a clearly work-
related activity. As the petitioner's injury-causing activity in 
this case was just a routine homeowner maintenance activity, the 
respondent argues that it does not meet the requirement of being in 
the course of employment. In addition, the respondent argues that 
the risk involved in that activity was not a risk attributable to 
the employer, but rather was a personal risk that the petitioner 
faced, as a result of being a homeowner. 
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DISCUSSION AND AUTHORITY: 
Offices in the home have greatly increased recently, as a 
result of communication advances (computers) that now allow 
information exchanges not possible in the past. With employees 
working out of their homes, the prior workers compensation rules 
and theories are not very helpful in determining what activities 
will be covered and which will be considered deviations from the 
course of employment. Bright line tests offered by the "business 
premises'1 and meal time breaks do not apply, where someone is 
working in their home. The parties have cited to a few "home 
office" cases, but most of the cases cited in the briefs do not 
involve home offices, but rather deal with various situations 
involving work performed away from the business premises. The ALJ 
is inclined to find the cases dealing specifically with home 
offices to be more on point, in analyzing the compensability issue 
in the instant case. This is because the ALJ finds there is a 
fundamental difference between situations where work is 
occasionally done away from the normal business/work location, and 
cases where the home has been designated as the normal, or only, 
business/work location. 
The two cited cases that clearly involve true home office 
situations are Joe/s Ready Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 65 So. 2d 
268 (Miss. 1953) and Black River Dairy Products. Inc.. 207 No. W. 
2d 65 (Wis. 1973) (no Utah cases involving home offices have been 
cited) . In both cases, the home was the primary, or only, place 
where the employee performed work and the courts in both cases 
found coverage existed. In the Ready case, the court went to the 
extreme of accepting that moving a shot gun was in the course of 
employment, because the employee needed to work where the shot gun 
was located. The Black River case actually goes on at length 
discussing the fact that the employer was not just condoning the 
use of the home as a work location, but actually had decided that 
this should be the primary work locale. Therefore, when the 
employee was injured going from his house to his car, the court 
noted that the employee was not going to work, but rather was at 
work and on the employer's premises, since the employer had 
provided no other place of work for the employee, besides his home. 
Many of the cases cited deal with whether travel from home 
to regular business premises is covered, where the home was 
considered an accepted locale to perform some of the work. Kaycee 
Coal Co, v. Short. 450 S.W. 2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), Wilson V. 
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Service Broadcasters, Inc., So. 2d 1339 (Miss. 1986). These cases 
found coverage while the employee was in the process of traveling, 
on the basis that travel between several business premises 
locations is generally covered. The ALJ finds that these cases are 
not really similar factually to the instant case under review. 
Most, if not all, of the cases where benefits were denied are cases 
where there was no true home office situation. Peetz v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 604 P.2d 2525 (Ariz* 1979) after hours injury with business 
tool, D.E.S. Youth Conservation Corps v. Industrial Comm'n, 630 
P.2d 58 (Ariz. 1981) recreational injury with prohibited weapon 
while in 24-hour residency situation, Glasser v. Youth Shoo, 54 So. 
2d 686 (Fla. 1951) fall at home carrying work books, where there 
was no requirement that employee take books home, Rowan v. 
University of Nebraska, 299 N. W. 2d 774 (Neb. 1980) art professor 
fixing an at-home studio window, where home studio was an option 
for professor, but was not required by university, Owens v. 
Chrysler Corporation, 371 N. W. 2d 519(Mich. 1985) employee dies of 
heart attack trying to move a vehicle so he could get ready to go 
on a business trip, Lovd v. Texas Employers Ins. Asso. 280 S.W. 2d 
955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) on-call employee working on a ladder 
outside his home when phone rang and he fell off ladder going to 
answer it. In one Louisiana case where benefits were denied, it is 
simply unclear if a true home office situation was involved. 
Danielson v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158 So. 2d 609 (La. 1963) . 
The above-noted cases appear to show that courts are willing 
to take a more expansive view of what activities at-home are 
covered, if the employee is required to work at home. The courts 
in Ready Shell and Black River found coverage, even though the 
actual injury-causing activity was not a specific work duty, but 
rather was an act that led up to work being performed. In the 
cases in which employer-required home offices were not involved, 
the courts were more strict in requiring that the injury-causing 
activity was an actual work duty. These results are logical. If 
the employee has chosen to do some work at home, it cannot be said 
that the employer has chosen to accept every risk associated with 
the home as an employment risk. However, when the employer chooses 
to make the employee7s home the only location for__wprk, the 
employer can arguably be considered to have accepted the risks 
associated with the home, i.e. the home becomes a business 
premises. This principal has been stated by Professor Larson in 
his treatise. A. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation. Section 
18.34, p. 4-428 (1997) . 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ finds that the petitioner was injured in the course 
of his employment, while salting the driveway to his home on 
January 30, 1997. The ALJ would agree that, even where the 
employer has chosen to make the employee7s home his only work site, 
there is not 2 4-hour coverage by the employer for any accident that 
occurs within the home. Some connection must exist between the 
injury-causing activity and the employee7s work duties. If the 
employee suddenly decides to mow the lawn in the middle of the work 
day, because he notices that the grass is getting long, and he is 
injured doing so, this is not necessarily a work injury, simply 
because the home is the work site. However, in the instant case, 
the ALJ finds that the petitioner was engaged in a work-related 
duty when he was injured salting the driveway, because he was, in 
essence, removing an obstacle which could have impeded his work. 
If the display could not be delivered due to the impassable 
driveway, he would have been without an item he needed to 
accomplish his presentation on the up-coming business trip. 
Therefore, the petitioner went about removing the obstacle to the 
delivery, i.e the ice on the driveway. 
Professor Larson has noted that, just because someone else 
might be the immediate beneficiary of the employee moving an 
obstacle to work, this does not change the fact that the ultimate 
effect of the act is to advance the employer's work. A. Larson, 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section 27.21, p. 5-380 (1997). 
Therefore, it is more or less irrelevant that the petitioner 
benefitted somewhat personally from salting the driveway, because 
the ultimate effect was to remove an obstacle to delivery of the 
display, allowing him to go forward with his work. If the ultimate 
effect is to the benefit of the employer, the general rule is that 
the act is considered in the course of employment. A. Larson, 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Section 27.00 (1997). 
The ALJ believes that the petitioner had the delivery of the 
display in mind, when he went about broadcasting the salt. Just 
prior to his fall, he had been loading items in his car, that he 
needed to take on his business trip. It is logical that he would 
have then thought of the one missing item, i.e. the display, and 
the fact that it was to be delivered that day. In combination, the 
sight of the mail carrier in the area, caused the petitioner to go 
get the salt. Although he possibly might have decided to salt the 
drive way at some point anyway, for his own non-job related 
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purposes, this does not change the fact that, when he did do it, it 
was in an attempt to remove the obstacle that could have prevented 
delivery of the display. It also does not change the fact that the 
ultimate result was that the employer was benefitted by the attempt 
to remove the obstacle. The employer chose to have the 
petitioner's home be his only work site. The employer also chose 
to have the home be the only place where the petitioner received 
his business mail and deliveries, including large awkward packages. 
In this choice, the employer accepted the risk associated with 
maintenance of the petitioner's driveway, which needed to be 
traversed in order to make deliveries. 
Based on the foregoing explanation, the ALJ finds that the 
petitioner is entitled to workers compensation benefits for his 
January 30, 1997 compensable work accident. He is statutorily 
permanently totally disabled, per U.C.A. 35-1-67 (now U.C.A. 34A-2-
413) . As a result, he is entitled to lifetime benefits. 
BENEFITS DUE: 
The petitionees compensation rate is figured as follows: 
$36,500.00 per year divided by 12 » $3,041.67 per month, divided by 
4.33 = $702.46 per week x .667 = $468.54/week, which allows the 
petitioner the maximum permanent total disability rate of $379.00 
per week. The petitioner is entitled to this amount for life. 
Attorney fees are based on the first 312 weeks or $118,248.00, 
figured as required by Commission rule R602-2-4, entitling the 
petitioner's attorney to the maximum rate of $7,500.00, which 
should be deducted from accrued benefits due the petitioner 
(currently approximately 77 weeks, or $29,183.00). 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay the petitioner, Charles Tjas, 
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $379.00, 
beginning the date of his compensable industrial injury, January 
30, 1997 and continuing for the remainder of his life. Accrued 
amounts are due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per 
annum, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the January 30, 1997 industrial accident; said 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, AE Clevite, 
Inc./Liberty Mutual Insurance, pay K. Dawn Atkin, attorney for the 
petitioner, the sum of $7,500.00, for services rendered in this 
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the 
petitioner, and to be remitted directly to the office of K. Dawn 
Atkin. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of 
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless 
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to 
review or appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the 
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within 
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for 
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. 
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the 
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties 
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board 
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days 
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion 
for Review, the request must be made within 20 days of the date of 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1998. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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